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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondant 
vs. 
ROBERT MAXSON VICKERS, 
Defendant-Appellant 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a case of first impression involving a 
comparison as to the meaning and possible overlap of two 
statutes in the new criminal code. This appeal is from a 
conviction, judgement and sentence for the crime of Placing 
of an Infernal Machine in violation of section 76-10-307 
U.C.A. 1953 (as amended). The issue raised by Appellant is 
that he should have been convicted and sentenced for the crime 
of Arson by means of explosives in violation of section 76-
6-102. 
DISPOSTION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried by jury before the Honorable J. Harlan 
Burns, Judge of the Fifth Judicial Court, and convicted and 
sentenced for Placing of an Infernal Machine"in violation of 
section 76-10-307 U.C.A. 1953 (as amended). 
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Appellant argued throughout his trial that he could only 
properly be convicted of and sentenced for the crime of Arson 
by means of explosives. This argument was raised in the form 
of motions for a dismissal and directed verdict; requested 
jury instructions on the offense of Arson and the definition 
of Infernal Machine; objections to the jury instruction 
used by the trial court in defining Infernal Machine; and a 
motion at the time of judgement and sentencing wherein Appellant 
requested that he be sentenced in accordance with the penalty 
provisions for the crime of Arson. 
This appeal is from the rulings of the trial court in 
denying all of Appellant's motions and requests concerning the 
argument that Appellant was guilty of the crime of Arson by 
means of explosives rather than the crime of Placing of an 
Infernal Machine. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of his conviction and sentence 
and respectfully requests that this court remand this case for 
resentencing as a class A misdemeanor. In the alternative, 
Appellant seeks a new trial wherein the jury would be instructed 
on the crime of Arson by means of explosives. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Shortly after 2:00 a.m. on March 13, 1975, in Washington, 
Utah, the back end of a car belonging to Phillip Hartley was 
blown up (T. 21). Shortly thereafter Appellant was found in 
the back yard of the Hartley residence. 
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Appellant had taken some dynamite and placed it at the 
back bumper of the Hartley car (T.108). After lighting it, 
he left the scene, but realized what he had done and returned 
to undo what he had started (T.108,9). The time between lighting 
the charge and returning to the car was established by Appellant 
at four to ten minutes (T. 118) , and as he grabbed the dynamite 
it exploded (T. 108,9). As is common practice in detonating 
dynamite, Appellant had used a blasting cap and fuse (T. 113). 
The car was damaged in the amount of $975.00 (T. 28). 
Appellant testified he just wanted to cause damage to the car 
(T. 108. 118), but some circumstantial damage did occur. 
Some plaster boards and nails in the house had been jarred 
about a quarter inch by the concussion and the front porch roof 
was loosened (T. 22,23 ). There was also damage to grass and 
bushes and doors on a shed (T. 23). This other damage amounted 
to $415.00 (T. 28,29). The damage to the shed doors appears to 
have occured by Appellant running into the shed after the 
explosion (T. 24). 
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POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT APPELLANT'S 
MOTIONS FOR DISMISSAL AND DIRECTED VERDICT BASED ON 
THE FACT THE EVIDENCE SHOWED A VIOLATION OF THE CRIME 
OF ARSON RATHER THAN THE CRIME OF PLACING OF AN 
INFERNAL MACHINE. 
This is a case of first impression. Appellant admits 
that he is guilty of damaging property of another by means of 
explosives. The central issue on appeal is which of two 
statutes Appellant should have been convicted and sentenced 
under. 
Appellant claims he should have been convicted arid 
sentenced under Section 76-6-102 Utah Code Annotated (1953 
as amended), which provides; 
A person is guilty of arson if, under circumstances 
not amounting to aggravated arson, by means of fire 
o r
 explosives, he unlawfully and intentionally damages: 
(a) Any property with intention of defrauding 
an insurer; or 
(b) The property of another. 
(2) A violation of subsection (a) is a felony 
of the third degree. A violation of subsection (b) 
is a felony of the third degree if the damage caused 
exceeds $5,000 value; and Class A misdemeanor if the 
damage exceeds $1,000 but is not more than $5,000 
value; a Class B misdemeanor if the damage caused 
exceeds $250 but is not more than $1,000; any other 
violation is a Class C misdemeanor. (Emphasis Added) 
The section under which Appellant was charged, convicted, 
and sentenced, 76-10-307, provides: 
Every person who delivers or causes to be delivered 
to any express or railway company or other common 
carrier, or to any person, any infernal machine, 
knowing it to be such, without informing the common 
carrier or person of the nature thereof, or sends it 
through the mail, or throws or places it on or about 
the premises or property of another, or in any place 
where another may be injured thereby in his person 
or property, is guilty of a felony of the second 
degree. 
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Section 76-10-306 defines infernal machine as follows: 
An infernarl machine is any box, package, contrivance, 
bomb, or apparatus containing or arranged with an 
explosive or acid or poisonous or inflamable substance, 
chemical, or compound, or knife, loaded pistol, or 
gun, or other dangerous or harmful weapon or thing, 
constructed, contrived, or arranged so as to explode, 
ignite, or throw forth its contents, or to strike with 
any of its parts, unexpectedly when moved, handled, 
or operned, or after the lapse of time or under 
conditions or in a manner calculated to endanger 
health, life, limb, or property. 
At the close of the State's case Appellant moved for a 
dismissal of the charge of Placing of an Infernal Machine as 
alleged in the Information (T.105). A similar motion was 
made for a directed verdict after both parties had rested 
(T.120,1). These motion were again presented after the jury 
had retired and were again denied (T. 133,4). Both motions 
were based upon a showing from the evidence that the State 
had failed to prove the existance of an Infernal Machine and 
the case could only properly be submitted to the jury on a 
theory of Arson by means of explosives. For the reasons stated 
below, the trial court erred in not granting Appellant's 
motions. 
The evidence produced by the estate showed that Appellant 
had damaged the property of another by means of dynamite and 
the Appellant had some blasting caps and fuse stored where 
he lived. During Appellant's own testimony it was established 
that he had in fact used a blasting cap and fuse to detonate 
the dynamite. This evidence places the actions of Appellant 
squarely within the statute governing Arson. 
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The Infernal Machine violation is obviously contemplated 
to involve something other than the simple use of the type 
of explosives exemplified in the instant case. The conduct 
of Appellant clearly constitute damage to proerpty" . . . by 
means of fire or explosives . . . " under the Arson statute, 
but can hardly be said to involve a " . . . box, package, contri-
vance, bomb, or apparatus containing or arranged with an 
explosive • . ."as required by the section 76-10-306 definition 
of Infernal Machine. 
Any explosive material requires that something be done 
to it or added to it to make it explode. If dynamite with a 
blasting cap and fuse is construed as a matter of law 
as meeting the definition of Infernal Machine, it is difficult 
for one to imagine what the legislature had in mind when it 
included the use of explosives in the Arson statute. 
In overruling Appellant's motion for a dismissal and 
directed verdict, the trial court necessarily ruled that the 
simple use of dynamite with a blasting cap and fuse constitutes 
an Infernal Machine. If this is so, then by enacting the new 
criminal code the legislature passed overlaping statutes 
with incongruous penalty provisions. 
Arson requires actual damage and provides for a range 
of punishments between a Class C misdemeanor and a third degree 
-6-
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felony depending on the actual loss of value. The crime of 
placing of an Infernal Machine does not require any actual 
loss and is punished as a second degree felony. Under the 
statutory construction used by the trial court in denying 
Appellant's motions, a person who only attempted to commit 
a Class C misdemeanor Arson would necessarily have also 
committed a second degree felony Placing of an Infernal 
Machine. Such a result could not logically have been intended 
by the legislature. 
To reconcile the crime of Arson by means of explosives 
with the crime of Placing of an Infernal Machine, it is 
logical to interpret the definition of Infernal Machine 
as encompassing a concept such as that of a time bomb or 
booby trap which is more intricate than the simple use of 
explosives. This interpretation embodies the notion of moving 
mechanical parts and is more consistant with the ordinary 
meaning of the word machine. Under such an interpretation 
there would be no conflict between the statutes governing 
Arson and Infernal Machine. The definition of Arson would 
be met where, as in the instant case, a defendantfs conduct 
was limited to destruction of property by use of a simple 
explosive means; and the definition of Infdrnal Machine would 
be met if, for example, a defendant rigged dynamite to a car 
in such an arrangement that starting the car would cause an 
explosion. wSuch a statutory construction would also be 
consistant with the existance of a " . . . box, package, 
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contrivance, bomb, or apparatus containing or arranged with 
an explosive. . . " 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO ALLOW APPELLANT'S 
JURY INSTRUCTION REGARDING THE OFFENSE OF ARSON, 
DENYING APPELLANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION ON 
DEFINITION OF INFERNAL MACHINE, AND IN OVERRULING 
APPELLANT'S OBJECTION TO THE INCOMPLETE DEFINITION 
OF INFERNAL MACHINE USED BY THE COURT IN INSTRUCTING 
THE JURY. 
Appellant's requested jury instruction number 3 (R.48) 
is a definition of Infernal Machine taken directly from the 
statutory definition found in Section 76-10-306 and reads 
as follows: 
An infernal machine is defined as follows: 
Any box, package, contrivance, bomb, or apparatus 
containing or arranged with an explosive or acid 
or poisonous or inflamable substance, chemical 
or compound, or knife, loaded pistol, or gun, or cither 
dangerous or harmful weapon or thing, constructed, 
contrived, or arranged so as to explode, ignite, 
or throw forth its contents, or to strike with any 
of its parts, unexpectedly when moved, handled, or opened, 
or after the lapse of time or under conditions or in a 
manner calculated to endanger health, life, limb, or property. 
Appellant's requested jury instruction number 4 (R. 49) 
reads as follows: 
If you have a reasonable doubt as to whether the State 
has established each and every element necessary to 
convict the defendant of the crime of Delivery of an 
Infernal Machine, you should next consider whether the 
defendant is guilty of the crime of arson. 
- Q _ 
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Appellant's requested jury instruction number 5 (R.50) 
provides the statutory elements necessary to find the defendant 
guilty of arson and reads as follows: 
To warrant you in finding the defendant guilty of 
the Crime of Arson, you must find beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant: 
(1) Intentionally damaged the property of another; 
(2) That said damage was done by use of fire or 
explosives; and 
(3) That said acts occured in Washington County, 
State of Utah. 
Appellant objected to the Trial Court's refusal to give 
these instructions (T.128), and the definition of infernal 
machine in Instruction Number 15 (R. 62) as given by 1he court 
was also objected to by Appellant (T. 123, 124). Instruction 
Number 15 as given reads as follows: 
You are instructed that an infernal machine is 
any package, contrivance, bomb or apparatus containing 
or arranged with an explosive constructed, contrived 
or arranged so as to explode after the lapse of time 
or in a manner calculated to endanger property. 
As noted in Appellant's exception to Instruction Number 
15, Appellant's "entire defense is based on the definition of 
infernal machine1' (T ] 23)
 i( and Appellant was denied the 
opportunity to have the jury determine the meaning of that 
term since it did not have the entire definition. 
The impact of the Trial Court's refusal to give the 
complete statutory definition of infernal machine was substantially 
aggravated by the Court's refusal to grant AppelIaiit's requested 
instruction on Arson. The effect of this procedure by 
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the Trial Court was to rule that Appellant's actions constituted 
delivery of an Infernal Machine and did not, as a matter of lav/ 
constitute arson. In refusing to give Appellant's requested 
instructions 4 and 5 (R. 49,50) regarding the crime of arson, 
Appellant was denied the right to have the jury consider Arson 
as a possible alternative to finding Appellant guilty of 
placing in Infernal Machine. 
Under the rulings of the trial court on the above 
noted jury instructions, it appears to be impossible for one 
to commit the crime of Arson by use of explosives. The intent 
of legislature is passing section 76-6-102 on Arson contemplates 
no such premis. The offense which the legislature contemplated 
when providing for Arson by means of explosives has been 
eliminated by judicial fiat under the rulings by the trial 
court. Such a result is in direct disregard for the manifest 
intent of the legislature to create two separate and distinct 
crimes. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT WAS DENIED EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS AND 
• DUE PROCESS BECAUSE HE WAS NOT GIVEN THE BENEFIT 
OF RECEIVING THE LESSER OF TWO POSSIBLE STATUTORY 
PUNISHMENTS FOR THE SAME ACT. 
It cannot be questioned that Appellant's act constituted 
the crime of Arson as provided in Section 76-6-102. If such an 
act is also construed as Placing an Infernal Machine as provided 
in Section 7 6-10-307 then the legislature has made the same 
act subject to two different sanctions and Appellant 
-10-
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s!ioiild have been sentenced under the lesser penalty. 
At the time of sentencing, Appellant argued as a 
cause against judgement that under the Utah Supreme Court 
cases of State v. Fair, 23 1 Jtal i 2(1 34, 456 p. 2d, l l '° (1969) 
and State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343, 4 53 P. 2d. 14*. ,-^N Appellant 
should be sentenced to the punishment provided for a Class 
A misdemeanor under the arson statute since the value of 
the property damage was less than $5,000. This motion 
was denied. (Sentencing Transcript ; ,4) 
In the cases of Fair, and Shondel., this court held that 
an accused should be accountable for only the lesser of two 
conflicting penalties where the same act has been made the 
subject of two legislative fiats. In reaching the decision 
in Shondel, the opinion of this court relied upon principles 
of equal protection of law in agreeing fl with the proposition 
. . . that the equal protection of the laws requires that they 
affect alike all persons similarly situated. :2 Utah; : 
at 345, 453 P. 2d at 147. Reliance was also placed on the 
principle that " . a penal statute should be . . . clear, 
specific and understandable as to the penalty imposed for its 
violation." 22 Utah 2d at 346, 453 P.2d at 248. 
Both of these principles of Shondel were violated by 
the compound effect in denying Appellant the opportunity to have 
the jury consider Arson and then denying Appellant1s motion 
-11-
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to be setenced under the Arson statute as the lesser of two 
possible penalties. 
If one were to decide to commit the crime of Arson by 
means of explosives and be willing to suffer the consequences 
established by the legislature, it would be impossible to do 
so under the rulings made by the trial court. Such a result is 
clearly inconsistant with the words of Chief Justice Crockett 
that " . . . a penal statute should be . . . clear, specific 
and understandable as to the penalty imposed for its violation." 
22 Utah 2d at 346, 453 P.2d at 148. 
CONCLUSION 
This case should be reversed and remanded for the reason 
that the evidence adduced at trial proved only the crime of 
Arson by means of explosives and does not support a finding 
of guilty of Placing of an Infernal Machine. The definition of 
Infernal Machine requires a more intricate or mechanical means 
than the simple use of dynamite employed by Appellant and the 
trial court erred in not granting Appellant's motions for 
dismissal and directed verdict. 
The refusal of the trial court to instruct the jury 
with respect to the crime of Arson by means of explosives denied 
Appellant due process of law. This error was compounded by 
the refusal of the trial court to sentence Appellant in compliance 
-12-
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with the principle stated in Shondel that " . . . where there 
is doubt or uncertainty as to which of two punishments is 
applicable to an offense an accused is entitled to the benefit 
of the lesser." 22 Utah 2d at 346, 453 P.2d at 148. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAYMOND S. SHUEY 
Attorney for Appellant 
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